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Abstract
The theory and practice of urban governance in recent years has undergone both a collaborative and participatory turn. The
strong connection between collaboration and participation has meant that citizen participation in urban governance has
been conceived in a very particular way: as varying levels of partnership between state actors and citizens. This over-focus
on collaboration has led to: 1) a dearth of proposals in theory and practice for citizens to engage oppositionally with insti-
tutions; 2) the miscasting of agonistic opportunities for participation as forms of collaboration; 3) an inability to recognise
the irruption of agonistic practices into participatory procedures. This article attempts to expand the conception of par-
ticipatory urban governance by adapting Rosanvallon’s (2008) three democratic counter-powers—prevention, oversight
and judgement—to consider options for institutionalising agonistic participatory practices. It argues that these counter-
governance processes would more fully realise the inclusion agenda that underpins the participatory governance project.
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1. The Collaborative Turn in Urban Governance
The theory and practice of urban governance in recent
years has undergone both a collaborative and participa-
tory turn (Bingham, 2006; Fung, 2004). In many ways the
two are very much connected. Ideas of collaborative gov-
ernance have become inextricably linked to hopes for
increased citizen participation in policy-making (Bussu,
in press). Though originally rooted in “neo-corporatism”
(Osborne, 2006), a concern to bring “multiple stakehold-
ers together in common forums with public agencies”
(Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 543), it is the citizen as stake-
holder that has particularly captured the imagination. In-
corporating citizens or local communities as partners in
the policy-making process is intended to address demo-
cratic malaise by repairing the relationship between citi-
zens and the state. It has been conceived as a response
to the dual problems of citizens’ declining interest and
participation in democratic politics and the lack of re-
sponsiveness of policy outcomes to citizen and commu-
nity needs (Barnes, Newman, & Sullivan, 2007; Geissel
& Newton, 2012). This new urban governance approach
has therefore become bound with a concurrent deliber-
ative and participatory democratic project. Governance
theorists have made “empowered participation” a defin-
ing tenet of the new approach (Torfing & Triantafillou,
2013), and stressed how “collaborative governance is
characterized by dialogue and deliberation” (Bingham,
2006, p. 817). Moreover, participatory and deliberative
democrats interested in deepening citizen participation
have made collaborative governance initiatives a promi-
nent category in typologies of democratic innovations
(Geissel & Newton, 2012; Smith, 2005).
This strong connection between collaborative and
participatory urban governance has meant that citizen
participation has been conceived in a very particular way:
as varying levels of partnership between state actors and
citizens. The urban space is, however, both a site for the
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formation of new collective solidarities and a site of deep
and enduring conflicts, for instance; increasingly sharp
conflicts over the possession of space between local res-
idents and global capital (Sassen, 2011). “Immovable re-
sistance” is a frequent issue for urban governors; one for
which the institutional response is often vilification of re-
sistance or an attempt to bypass it, in the process exac-
erbating the conflict (Inch et al., 2017). How to construc-
tively engage with citizen resistance is thus an impor-
tant problem for the practice of urban governance. Ag-
onistic democracy, with its focus on transforming antag-
onistic relations between implacable adversaries into ag-
onistic relations between legitimate opponents (Mouffe,
2000a), holds some promise in this regard. Nonetheless,
participatory urban governance, with its focus on part-
nership through collaborative dialogue and deliberation,
gives little guidance on how citizens can engage in ago-
nistic practices in the face of enduring conflicts.
This article addresses this lacuna by adapting
Rosanvallon’s (2008) three democratic counter-powers—
prevention, oversight and judgement—to consider op-
tions for institutionalising agonistic participatory prac-
tices in urban governance. In elaborating these forms
of counter-governance it is demonstrated how participa-
tory urban governance’s over-focus on collaboration has
led to: 1) a dearth of proposals in theory and practice for
citizens to engage oppositionally with institutions; 2) the
miscasting of agonistic opportunities for participation as
forms of collaboration; 3) an inability to recognise the
irruption of agonistic practices into participatory proce-
dures. It is further argued that this has had the effect of
curtailing the inclusion agenda that underpins most par-
ticipatory urban governance initiatives, since they have
failed to consider unequal influence after the point of the
decision and force citizens into a particular relation to in-
stitutions, privileging thosewhowant to collaborate over
those who want to contest. Institutionalising additional,
counter-governance opportunities would mitigate these
defects and broaden inclusion.
2. The Agonist Challenge to Collaborative Governance
“Collaborative governance” is used as a shorthand
throughout this article to refer to a family of ap-
proaches that have been variously termed collaborative
governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bingham, 2006), co-
governance (Smith, 2005; Talpin, 2012), New Public Gov-
ernance (Osborne, 2006), and co-production (Bovaird,
2007; Durose & Richardson, 2016). This family of ap-
proaches is often presented in paradigmatic terms, as
possessing its own distinct values and practices. The
New Public Governance has been situated as an alterna-
tive political-administrative system to Classical Public Ad-
ministration and the New Public Management (Osborne,
2006; Torfing & Triantafillou, 2013). Similarly, collabora-
tive governance is viewed as a replacement for older ad-
versarial and managerialist forms (Ansell & Gash, 2008;
Bingham, 2006), and Archon Fung has described partici-
patory urban governance as “a third path of reform that
takes its inspiration from the traditions of civic engage-
ment and participatory democracy rather than public-
management techniques or competitive markets” (2004,
p. 9). So what characterises this new approach?
The common core of these approaches is the way in
which the social relations between actors in governance
processes are conceived. Collaborative governance, as
the name would suggest, is intended to be collabora-
tive. Ansell and Gash’s influential definition stipulates
that it is characterised by collective and deliberative pro-
cesses of two-way communication with the aim of ar-
riving at consensus decisions (2008, p. 546). Citizens
and officials come together in processes of collective
problem-solving and mutual learning, in which discreet
but additive knowledge and expertise results in win-
win solutions (Durose & Richardson, 2016). Relations be-
tween them are not adversarial or competitive; they are
based on interdependence, trust, reciprocity and non-
domination (Durose & Richardson, 2016; Torfing & Tri-
antafillou, 2013). Opportunities for citizens to participate
in governance are therefore conceived and structured in
a particular way: citizens are discursive partners, both
with each other and with public officials, in a solidaristic
search for shared solutions to shared problems.
The elevation of collaboration, characterised as
shared endeavour through trust, reciprocity and non-
domination, to a paradigmatic value means that collab-
orative governance has a complicated, often confused,
relation to conflict. Collaboration is presented as an alter-
native to adversarialism and competition. Its advocates
do not deny the existence of conflicts and competing
societal interests, but these are something to be over-
come through collaboration. Collaborative governance is,
for instance, in the odd position of claiming it is a rem-
edy for declining trust in public institutions—a way to re-
build the relationship between citizens and state—whilst
it also “demands respect for different forms of expertise,
nuanced facilitation and relationships of trusts” (Durose
& Richardson, 2016, p. 200). As such, it is dependent
upon the thing it is intended to produce. It is possible
that institutionalising processes that demand trust will
generate trust; that behaviour will transform attitudes;
and that such processes will act as exemplars, radiating
out trust to the rest of the political system. However, it
is just as likely that, in the absence of trust, trust-based
procedureswill founder upon underlying conflicts. This is
particularly problematic in a “society of generalized dis-
trust” (Rosanvallon, 2008, p. 11), where reported levels
of trust in institutions and other citizens is low and de-
clining, and where increasing diversity is multiplying the
potential bases for conflicts.
The implicit assumption that collaboration can over-
come any conflict is indicated by the fact the collab-
orative governance literature gives little serious analy-
sis to how to proceed when irreducible conflicts break
out. Durose and Richardson do briefly discuss the is-
sue, retreating from consensus to Dryzek andNiemeyer’s
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idea of “meta-consensus” (2016, pp. 188–190). Nonethe-
less, this is unsatisfactory for co-governance processes
that claim to be about shared decision-making. Meta-
consensus is not a decision, but simply an agreement on
the basis of disagreement. Nor does it necessarily bring
us closer to a decision; elucidating the basis of a con-
flict may in fact sharpen the conflict rather than foster
its resolution. Meta-consensus is not then an alternative
coordination mechanism to consensus, it is no coordina-
tion mechanism at all. New participatory governance ap-
proaches thus seem to be beset by the perennial prob-
lem of radical participatory organisation: in the face of
irreducible conflicts there is no means of coordination
beyond splintering into new sub-groups.
Agonists have a very different conception of social
relations. A democratic space is one in which actors
face each other as opponents, not as partners. For ago-
nists, “politics is the continuation of war by othermeans”
(Foucault, 2004, p. 15). The democratic project is not
a search for shared solutions to shared problems but
one of turning enemies into adversaries who mutually
recognise each other’s legitimacy to inhabit the political
space (Mouffe, 2000b, 2013). Conflict and power are con-
stituent elements of a political relation, not something
that can be overcome through politics. The idea that the
pursuit of consensus untainted by coercion should be a
regulative ideal for assessing the legitimacy of decision-
making is also rejected, “we have to accept that every
consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional
hegemony, as a stabilization of power, and that it al-
ways entails some form of exclusion.” (Mouffe, 2000a,
p. 17). Every decision, even those arrived at through de-
liberation, necessarily results in the exclusion of some
interests, values and identities in favour of others. Any
decision is foreclosure of other possibilities. These ex-
clusions are then continually renegotiated, so that a
decision is only a temporary cessation of ongoing pro-
cesses confrontation. If we acknowledge this conception
of decision-making as a process of exclusion, moreover,
a process of exclusion structured by power, then it be-
comes paramount to consider the institutional avenues
by which those exclusions can be challenged. Whereas
collaborative governance has primarily focussed on mak-
ing decision processes more inclusive, the agonistic per-
spective points us to the need to also democratise av-
enues for challenging decisions.
Agonists have recognised the importance of creating
these institutional avenues, “to make room for dissent
and to foster the institutions in which it can be mani-
fested is vital for a pluralist democracy” (Mouffe, 2000a,
p. 17). Nevertheless, agonism has been described as hav-
ing an institutional deficit (Lowndes & Paxton, 2018). Un-
like deliberative democrats, who have invented a range
of procedures intended to manifest deliberative demo-
cratic principles, agonists have been much more circum-
spect in proposing agonistic institutional arrangements.
This is partly a result of the poststructuralist tradition
of deconstruction. Agonist democracy is “deconstructive,
rather than constructive. It focuses on the shortcomings
and limitations of other approaches and is suggestive of
alternatives but refrains from specifying them in any but
themost abstract form” (Norval, 2014, p. 77). In addition,
in the instances where radical pluralists have touched
on the empirical, this analysis has tended to focus on
the extra-institutional: the counter-power of civil society
(Rosanvallon, 2008); strategies for insurgent political par-
ties (Mouffe & Errejón, 2016); or citizens’ informal ago-
nistic practices in the spaces between institutions (Wa-
genaar, 2014). This appears to be a function of radical
pluralists’ belief that political science and philosophy has
a tendency to focus too narrowly on government institu-
tions and “to exclude and ignore all those wider relations
of governance through which individuals and groups are
subjected and constituted as actors and political agents”
(Griggs, Norval, & Wagenaar, 2014, p. 30).
Recent work has challenged the idea that agonism is
incompatible with institutionalisation. Lowndes and Pax-
ton (2018) attribute this to two false premises based on
an outdated conception of political institutions. The first
is that institutions are a fixed and stable expression of
shared values. The second, a corollary of the first, is that
to institutionalise is necessarily to reify and universalize
those values. The critical institutionalist conception of in-
stitutions as contingent means:
The key tenets of agonism actually resonate with con-
temporary developments in institutionalist thinking;
indeed, they provide theoretical resourceswithwhich
to extend such developments further. Rather than a
paradox, we find a productive tension. (Lowndes &
Paxton, 2018)
The next section of this article employs the theoretical re-
sources of agonism to go beyond the dominance of the
collaborative governance approach to theorising partici-
pation in urban governance. Using Rosanvallon’s (2008)
three democratic counter-powers as a framework it ex-
plores newways for citizens to adopt an agonistic relation
to institutional actors and engage in counter-governance.
Moreover, it suggests some ways that existing practices
of participation should be recast in agonistic terms.
3. Three Options for Institutionalised Participatory
Agonism
Agonistic practices have been designed into democratic
institutions since their foundation. Modern democracies
often arose out of circumstances of extreme conflict.
Institutional design was sensitive to the twin fears of
mob-rule and autocratic monarchy. James Madison, de-
scribing the federal institutions of the nascent US, ex-
plicitly justifies the separation of power between exec-
utive, legislature and judiciary in agonistic terms. The in-
tention was to arrange “opposite and rival interests” in
constant tension, “by so contriving the interior structure
of the government as that its several constituent parts
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may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keep-
ing each other in their proper places” (Madison, 1788).
Even in the UK, where democratic institutions devel-
oped through gradualist reform, agonistic practices still
abound. The weekly ritual of Prime Minister’s Questions
is a prominent example: the leader of the opposition,
confronts the government in an adversarial rhetorical
contest. Legal trials are another example of widespread
institutionalised agonism: prosecution and defence face-
off as opponents in a structured contest over truth. All
of these instances of enduring agonistic institutions are,
however, examples of elite contestation. They show that
institutionalising agonistic practices is possible, yet tell
us little about the prospects for institutionalising a more
participatory agonism.
This article is concerned with participatory agonism;
when actors within a participatory space recognise each
other as opponents, thus their relations are oppositional
rather than collaborative. This agonistic relation can be
constituted in multiple ways. The above are examples of
horizontal agonism between elites, and one can similarly
find horizontal agonism between citizens. The specific fo-
cus of this article is, however, a certain type of vertical ag-
onism: citizen opposition to institutional power. Rosan-
vallon (2008) proposes three counter-powers that can
be wielded against institutional power, which he terms
oversight, prevention and judgement. Each posits the
people in an agonistic relation with institutional actors,
so that counter-democracy broadens the minimal demo-
cratic conception of the people as electors to encompass
“the people as watchdogs, the people as veto-wielders,
and the people as judges” (Rosanvallon, 2008, p. 17).
Urban governance is a good starting point for explor-
ing these popular counter-powers since their historical
manifestationwas predominantly at this level. Theywere
often directly institutionalised in Ancient city states and
medieval towns, whereas the rise of the modern demo-
cratic nation state either subsumed such powers into
parliaments or dispersed them into an informal social
sphere (Rosanvallon, 2008, Chapter 3). In medieval Euro-
pean towns ordinary citizens were tasked with monitor-
ing and constraining the abuse of administrative power
through auditing town accounts, and this became a core
component of notions of citizenship (Rosanvallon, 2008,
p. 77). The practice has long roots stretching back to An-
cient Greek cities, which for Aristotle were democratic
to the extent that citizens scrutinised the work of magis-
trates through positions as overseers, auditors, supervi-
sors and ombudsmen (Rosanvallon, 2008, p. 85). These
forms of public audit typify the kind of institutionalised
participatory agonism that this article defines as counter-
governance. Counter-governance concerns mechanisms
for citizen opposition or contestation constituted with a
direct and formal relation to power, such that these be-
come an explicit organising principle for the coordination
of state activity. This differentiates it from Rosanvallon’s
conception of counter-democracy, which encompasses
informal power such as protest.
3.1. Prevention
Prevention is the power to obstruct. If government is the
positive power to decide upon collective projects, preven-
tion is its negative counterpart. Itsmost visiblemanifesta-
tion in democratic institutions is the power of the second
legislative chamber to block legislation. The notion of
popular prevention through the right to resist, founded
in the people’s capacity for insurrection, predates citi-
zens’ rights to vote or participate in government. Early
democratic theorists attempted to devise an institutional
alternative for insurrection based on a complex notion
of popular sovereignty that combined both positive and
negative elements (Rosanvallon, 2008). There is a reso-
nance between this negative power of prevention and
agonistic democracy as the institutionalisation of dissent
(Mouffe, 2000a; Norval, 2014) The agonistic perspective
on decision-making provides a clear rationale for the im-
portance of avenues to obstruct or oppose decisions. If
decision-making is an active process of creating inclu-
sions and exclusions, then it is impossible to determine
ex ante the significant cleavages uponwhich conflicts will
be founded. It is therefore important for thosewho recog-
nise their exclusion ex post to have means to seek re-
dress. Nonetheless, Rosanvallon sees popular prevention
disappearing from democratic institutions as liberal con-
ceptions of democracy began to predominate, so that it
is now exercised primarily through industrial strikes, civil
society protest and parliamentary opposition.
There have been few calls by advocates of partic-
ipatory urban governance to strengthen citizen partic-
ipation in these ex post forms of prevention, despite
the fact that institutionalised popular prevention is vir-
tually non-existent in urban governance. It is instruc-
tive, for instance, to examine Bingham’s (2006) outline
of new urban governance processes: citizen participa-
tion abounds in “upstream” processes of will-formation
and decision-making, but is absent from “downstream”
processes of disputation. Overview and Scrutiny Com-
mittees are the main accountability body responsible
for investigating the policies and implementation of En-
glish city governments. The Local Government Act 2000
divided city councils into two functions: Executive and
Overview and Scrutiny. Overview and Scrutiny Commit-
tees thus comprise of the city councillors who do not
form the council executive. They hold the primary mech-
anism of prevention, the power to call-in executive deci-
sions, delaying implementationwhilst a decision is scruti-
nised and a recommendation on whether it should pass,
be amended or withdrawn is made. Whilst it is constitu-
tionally possible for call-in to be triggered by the public,
only 2% of English local authorities allow the public to
perform this role (Cave, 2014). Even this weak preven-
tion power—the executive is not obliged to follow any
recommendation—thus mostly remains an elite rather
than a participatory mechanism.
Given that call-in is the nuclear option in city gov-
ernment, only activated when there are serious con-
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cerns of impropriety, it is necessary to consider means
for citizens to object to milder infractions. One poten-
tial means to obstruct is through petition. The internet
has facilitated the exponential growth of reactive peti-
tions through a plethora of new petitioning platforms.
There have even been moves to institutionalise these
processes by connecting them directly to national legis-
latures, for instance, in the UK and Finland. Nonetheless,
this has obscured the original conception of petitioning,
which was as a means for those wronged by institutional
power to present their claim for redress. There was no
requirement that an individual must demonstrate polit-
ical support with a welter of signatures. A single signa-
ture was enough (as it still is in Scotland). As such, in
early democracies, petitions provided a mechanism for
minorities and the unenfranchised to access lawmakers
and seek redress (McKinley, 2016). Popular prevention
is both underutilised and underpowered in today’s ur-
ban governance. An agonistic perspective directs us to-
wards strengthening these powers. A city-level right to
petition and expanding citizen participation in call-in are
two ways those who find themselves excluded by a deci-
sion could challenge it.
3.2. Oversight
Oversight is the surveillance of power to prevent its
abuse. Rosanvallon (2008) gives the people as watch-
dogs three principal tasks: vigilance, which is control
through constant and comprehensive active attention of
society to institutional action; denunciation, the identi-
fication and publicising of the violation of community
norms; and evaluation, analysis of institutional compe-
tence through technical assessment of quality and ef-
ficiency. His account is of a mostly mediated form of
surveillance, focussing on oversight through the media,
social movements, non-government organisations and
independent quasi-governmental agencies. It falls short
of an account of direct citizen participation in institution-
alised processes of oversight. Nevertheless, oversight is
the one form of counter-governance where citizen par-
ticipation is proliferating.
In theUK recently there have been awide range of ini-
tiatives to try to directly involve citizens in the oversight
of urban governance and public service institutions. The
creation of Overview and Scrutiny was accompanied by
mechanisms that draw on citizen vigilance. Citizens are
able to propose topics for scrutiny aswell as submit ques-
tions and evidence to scrutiny reviews (Dearling, 2010;
Stoker, Gains, Greasley, John, & Rao, 2007). Vigilance has
been accompanied by opportunities to become involved
in evaluation as a “co-optee” on scrutiny committees. Co-
option is not common, but Bristol City Council and the
London Borough of Waltham Forest retain pools of citi-
zens to act as co-optees (Dearling, 2010).
Citizen oversight of the executive has been matched
by opportunities to oversee local public services. There
has been an expansion of citizens’ roles in technical eval-
uation, through direct involvement in audit and inspec-
tion. One of the core functions of Healthwatch, which
draws its name from the “watchdog” metaphor, is en-
abling people to hold local services to account by mon-
itoring and reviewing provision (Local Government As-
sociation & Healthwatch, 2013). It uses various tools
to discharge these functions and understand quality of
performance from local people’s perspective, including
“enter and view” inspections, “patient-led assessments
of the care environment”, and “15-step challenge vis-
its” (Gilburt, Dunn, & Foot, 2015). Likewise, the Care
Quality Commission (CQC) now advertises for “experts-
by-experience” to assist inspections of health and social
care services.
Countries with endemic corruption problems are ex-
perimenting with citizen denunciation, creating anony-
mous mechanisms for informing on corrupt city officials,
such as Sierra Leone’s Pay No Bribe and India’s I Paid a
Bribe platforms.1 UK citizens have not been encouraged
to inform on city officials, though they have been encour-
aged to denounce neighbours fraudulently claiming so-
cial security through the creation of a National Benefit
Fraud Hotline.
The problem with oversight, unlike with prevention,
is not then an absence of opportunities. The dominance
of the collaborative governance approach for thinking
about participation, however, has meant that in practice
citizen oversight is often presented as another opportu-
nity to collaborate. CQC’s call for “experts-by-experience”
employs just such a collaborative governance trope. The
role of the citizen as a partner with professional inspec-
tors is emphasised, rather than the agonistic relation
to those who will be inspected. Even the inspector–
inspectee relationship is now cast in partially collabora-
tive terms through the notion of the “critical friend” (see
Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2005; Gilburt et al., 2015),
tasked both with holding to account and working con-
structively to improve effectiveness. This has had some
interesting effects. Local Healthwatch organisations, for
instance, have struggled to reconcile these opposing
functions, instead opting to act as critic or friend, but not
both (Gilburt et al., 2015). Oversight is not a friendly ac-
tivity, it is agonistic. The best overseers are suspicious
and forensic not collaborative. Recognising the differ-
ence between agonistic and collaborative practices could
help to prevent the kind of dissonance experienced by
Healthwatch. It could also point to a different imperative
for citizen recruitment. Collaborative governance, with
its concern for mutually respectful, collective preference
formation, is often wary of involving “the usual suspects”
with an axe to grind. Agonists instead advise us to mo-
bilise the passions (Mouffe, 2000a). Citizens with a legiti-
mate grievance against an institutionmay not be the best
candidates for partnership working, but they may prove
to be the best watchdogs.
1 See https://www.pnb.gov.sl and http://www.ipaidabribe.com
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3.3. Judgement
Popular judgement concerns the capacity of citizens to
constrain institutional action by testing it against com-
munity norms of governing. In ancient Athens, for in-
stance, tribunals of citizens, selected-by-lot, could strike
down the decisions of the Assembly as unconstitutional.
Rosanvallon (2008) sees two trends in modern democ-
racies that have eroded this once central function of citi-
zenship. The pronounced functional separation between
the judicial and political means that the judiciary has
absorbed these responsibilities. In addition, the liberal
democratic association of democracy with the act of vot-
ing has erased the separation between judgement and
authorisation. The vote becomes both an ex post judge-
ment of the incumbent government and an ex ante au-
thorisation of the new regime, without us ever knowing
which predominates. Nonetheless, citizen judgement as
members of a legal trial jury remains the most common
form of popular participation in the business of the state,
thus it is surprising that citizen judgement has not had a
more prominent place in theories of citizen participation
(Dean, 2017).
The only widespread citizen judgement in local gov-
ernance is a direct democratic innovation that is little re-
marked upon within the collaborative and participatory
governance literature: recall. Recall is a feature of urban
administrations in a number of countries from Poland to
the Philippines (Shah & Chaudhry, 2004), and the major-
ity of the more than 100 recall elections that occur an-
nually in the US affect city officials, predominantly city
councillors and school board members.2 As Rosanvallon
notes, recall is one form of voting that does not conflate
judgement and authorisation, and is closer to an indict-
ment than an election. Citizens solely render a verdict on
the behaviour of the representative, hence act more like
judges than electors (Rosanvallon, 2008, p. 209).
The popularity of deliberative mini-publics occasion-
ally leads to their somewhat unconventional use as quasi-
judicial processes of adjudication on controversial issues
(Dean, 2017). Two such urban governance cases that
have been thoroughly documented are: the use of a citi-
zens jury to breakthrough a deadlock resulting from lo-
cal opposition to the proposed restructuring of health
services in the English city of Leicester (Parkinson, 2004),
and a citizens assembly launched in response to a stale-
mate when residents of Vancouver mobilised in oppo-
sition to a City Council neighbourhood plan that they
viewed as unduly influenced by property developers
(Beauvais &Warren, 2015). Nevertheless, as deliberative
democratic innovations, these cases are analysed in de-
liberative democratic terms and their potential agonistic
function is underappreciated. Despite noting their roots
in local opposition to institutional action neither Parkin-
son nor Beauvais and Warren consider that their cases
could be fulfilling a need for popular judgement. Beau-
vais and Warren, for instance, instead view their case as
an attempt to fix a broken communication link within the
local administration.
The irruption of agonistic practices is seen as a demo-
cratic threat. Parkinson argues the use ofmini-publics for
adjudication by randomly selected citizens is a threat to
deliberative democratic norms since it excludes active
citizens from processes of reflective preference trans-
formation. An agonist might share Parkinson’s concern
about this exclusion of active citizens, though for a dif-
ferent reason. The randomly-selected citizens of a citi-
zens jury usually also play the roles of prosecution and
defence, expected to quiz expert witnesses from differ-
ent angles of the debate. There is a risk that, given these
citizens are specifically selected because they are not ac-
tive in the agonistic confrontation, this process abstracts
too far from the conflict, and thus the jury will make
proposals that are unacceptable to both sides. It is no-
table that this tension is manifest in the practice of Beau-
vais and Warren’s case: local partisans who had been
instrumental in opposing the rejected neighbourhood
plan forced the organisers to compromise on random se-
lection for the citizens’ assembly to draft the new plan.
Again, the authors view this as a threat to democratic
norms of inclusion. These examples indicate two poten-
tial benefits of a greater attention to an agonistic per-
spective. It would provide the conceptual tools to ap-
preciate when participatory processes take on an ago-
nistic dimension and situate such practices in competing
democratic norms, rather than viewing them simply as a
democratic threat. In addition, it can assist the design of
more appropriate institutional innovations, so that mini-
publics are not used for rendering popular judgement de-
spite question marks over their suitability for this task
from deliberative and agonistic perspectives.
4. Conclusion
There have been few proposals in urban governance the-
ory or practice for democratic innovations that enable
citizens to contest institutional power. Citizens’ powers
of popular prevention and judgement are virtually non-
existence. The agonistic character of oversight has been
neglected, instead miscast as another opportunity for
collaboration. The notion of counter-governance, char-
acterised as institutionalised participatory agonism, pro-
vides a lens for redressing these dysfunctions of the dom-
inance of collaboration in conceiving of participatory ur-
ban governance. However, this article should not be
read as a proposal to replace collaborative governance
with a new counter-governance paradigm. Citizens and
city officials will always be potential partners and po-
tential adversaries. Collaborative governance will thus
in many cases be wholly appropriate, but its claim to
paradigm status as a comprehensive mode of governing
occludes certain other organisational possibilities. It is
far from clear that collaboration is always the most ap-
propriate mode of interaction between citizens and city
2 See https://ballotpedia.org/Political_recall_efforts and http://recallelections.blogspot.co.uk
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 180–188 185
officials, particularly when their interests diverge. We
should remember that historically the term also has its
negative connotations: collaboration can mean working
together as equal partners but also acquiescence in op-
pressive power.
The over-focus on collaboration has restricted in two
ways the laudable inclusion agenda that underpins many
efforts at participatory urban governance. The first is
that there has been a proliferation of attempts to include
citizens in “upstream” deliberations pre-decision (Bing-
ham, 2006) in order to diversify influences over public
decisions, however; agonists’ insight that the decision it-
self creates exclusions, means we need to also consider
unequal influence after the decision. The institutionali-
sation of means for ex post citizen contestation of insti-
tutional action would go some way to broadening inclu-
sion. It could help to improve a long-standing problem
of collaborative governance initiatives: that they often
result in frustration for participants as competing insti-
tutional imperatives thwart implementation (Lowndes,
Pratchett, & Stoker, 2001; Newman, Barnes, Sullivan, &
Knops, 2004) or authorities cherry-pick proposals that fit
existing agendas (Font, Smith, Galais, & Alarcon, 2017).
Properly constituted forms of citizen prevention, over-
sight and judgement could reduce officials’ discretion to
side-line citizens’ priorities.
Constructing almost all participation opportunities in
collaborative terms forces those who want to participate
into a particular relationshipwith the state: theymust ac-
cept the state as a partner for collaboration. This may at
times be inappropriate, as it neglects the violence that in-
stitutions sometimes do to citizens, particularly the poor-
est citizens. It is not reasonable to ask someone on the
verge of being ousted from the neighbourhood where
they grew-up by a gentrifying regeneration programme
to accept the officials pushing the plan as partners for
collaboration. Such experiences often create an energy
amongst those affected to become involved to prevent
government failing them and others like them. Collabo-
rative initiatives are unlikely to prove very attractive to
those who have a deep grievance. Agonistic processes
that “mobilise the passions” (Mouffe, 2000a) and enable
them to enter into an oppositional relation with insti-
tutions would be more likely to harness this energy to
improve governance for those whose needs are often
overlooked. This is the second way that expanding ag-
onistic participation in urban governance could make it
more inclusive.
This article has provided three directions for think-
ing about how counter-governance could expand our
conception of participatory urban governance, but it is
only a starting point. Institutionalising participatory ag-
onism is unlikely to be straightforward, and requires a
great deal of further theoretical development and em-
pirical research. Prevention, oversight and judgement
hold promise for constructive engagement in the face of
the conflicts that often characterise contemporary urban
governance, butwhether they do in factwork is an empir-
ical question. Participation is often proposed as a remedy
for the failures of representative processes (Fung, 2006),
however; counter-governance mechanisms will also cre-
ate new tensions with representative modes of govern-
ing. If poorly configured, their introduction could result
in a sclerotic urban governance in which it is impossi-
ble to achieve anything. Mobilising the passions, for in-
stance, may be functional for processes of oversight, but
less so for prevention and judgement if it blocks all deci-
sions, including those made in good faith.
It must also be remembered that not all citizen re-
sistance to institutional power is laudable. In the US, for
example, there are instances of white families opposing
school redistricting reforms that aim to increase socio-
economic and racial diversity (Inch et al., 2017). Under-
standing how to prevent elite domination of forms of
counter-governance, particularly their potential for un-
dermining legitimate decisions arrived at through repre-
sentative democratic processes, will be a key question.
Some ideas can be borrowed from the more mature
participatory governance literatures, for example; selec-
tion of participants by sortition has been a common fea-
ture of deliberative innovations in order to prevent in-
terest group domination and improve inclusion. Interest-
ingly there have been proposals to appoint the aforemen-
tioned co-optees to Overview and Scrutiny Committees
by lot (Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2005). New thinking
will also be needed. One proposal by Lucie Laurian is that
planning should have an inbuilt bias towards those with
least choices, giving them a veto over plans that violate
sites they hold sacred (Inch et al., 2017). This would be
one way to orient forms of prevention towards inclusion.
There is also potential for expanding institution-
alised participatory agonism beyond prevention, over-
sight and judgement. As aforementioned, this article is
limited to citizen-state conflicts. Yet conflicts can be ar-
ticulated along many dimensions, for instance; they can
be between citizens, within institutions, or multi-faceted
rather than dichotomous. As such there is a need to
elaborate how agonistic processes can deal with differ-
ent kinds of conflicts. How collaborative and agonistic
practices may usefully be combined in order to comple-
ment each other also remains a topic for further theo-
retical and empirical exploration. It would seem unlikely
that there will be a single model for all seasons; institu-
tional design needs to take account of context. In circum-
stances of high trust and a shared vision between citi-
zens and officials then a collaborative partnership may
be possible and agonistic checks unnecessary. When dis-
trust and conflict prevail the presence of robust mech-
anisms for oversight and prevention may be a prerequi-
site of carving out a space for collaboration. Such combi-
nations are likely to be contingent, negotiated amongst
the actors involved, still; it is useful to understand which
types of design might achieve which ends. The pursuit of
these questions and the development of a fuller under-
standing of how to institutionalise participatory agonism
will furnish a more comprehensive set of tools for revi-
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 180–188 186
talising urban governance to negotiate the conflicts that
pervade the 21st century city.
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